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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
According to a Statistics South Africa report, South Africa is rated amongst the 
world‟s and Africa‟s most important mining countries. It has the world‟s largest 
reserves of coal, Platinum Group Metals (PGM) and coal. 1   South Africa‟s rich 
endowment of minerals played a key role in the evolution of its economy as its 
mineral industry, based mainly on gold, coal, diamonds and PGM, has made a vital 
contribution to its economy.2 
Leon highlights South Africa‟s mining domination both regionally and globally. He 
states that the South African mining industry contributes US$357bn towards the 
economy; its mining industry is the biggest in Africa and it has the world‟s largest 
mineral reserves which are estimated at US$2.5tn.3  The mining sector accounts for 
roughly  5.3% of South Africa‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and also employs an 
estimated 500,000 employees directly and a further 500,000 indirectly. Its centrality 
to the South African economy is based on the fact that nearly 60% of the country‟s 
export revenue comes from mining, minerals and secondary beneficiated products.4 
Despite the mining sector‟s dominant position in Africa and in the world as well as 
being the biggest contributor to the South Africa‟s GDP, Leon argues that between 
2001 and 2008 the value added to GDP by this sector remained flat. Furthermore, by 
October 2011, South African mine production had fallen by 12.7% year on year.5 
                                                          
1
Statistics SAMineral accounts for South Africa: 1980-2009 Discussion document (2012) 1  
2
Statistics SA (2012) 1. 
3
Leon P „Whither the South African Mining Industry?‟ (2012)  30 (1) Journal of Energy & Natural 
Resource Law 5. 
4
Leon P (2012) 6. 
5
Leon P (2012) 7. 
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In terms of accidents and ill-health, mining is regarded as the most hazardous 
industrial sector due to the fact that mining has a poor record in these respects 
compared to other economic sectors such as railways, construction and 
manufacturing.6  Hermanus argues that mine working environments are challenging 
as they can degrade rapidly and can also change as mining progresses.7  He further 
points out that in this industry ergonomic hazards are common as miners handle 
heavy equipment and do heavy work. In addition, there are also other threats 
contributing to unsafe working conditions, such as dust and noise which are 
associated with rock breaking, as well as blasting which releases harmful gases into 
the underground environment.8  The dangers associated with working in mines are 
illustrated in case law, such as, Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd.9  In this case the 
applicant who was a mineworker employed by Anglogold Ashanti, contracted 
tuberculosis and chronic obstructive airways, regarded as „compensatable‟ diseases 
in terms of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act (ODIMWA).10 
In 2012 the mining sector experienced unprecedented unrest. There were a number 
of particularly violent strikes, one which at the Lonmin platinum mines in Marikana 
ended in tragedy with number of lives being lost. On 16 August 2012, 34 of 
protesting mine workers were killed, in addition to ten people who were killed in the 
week leading up to the tragedy, taking the death toll to 44; furthermore, 70 were 
injured and more than a total 250 arrested.11 
                                                          
6
Hermanus MA „Occupational health and safety in mining-status, new developments and concerns‟ 
(2007) 107 The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 531. 
7
Hermanus MA (2007) 531. 
8
Hermanus MA (2007) 531. 
9
 (2011) 32 ILJ 545 (CC). 
10
Act 78 of 1973. 
11
MacGregor K„Comment and analysis: Africa massacre at Marikana‟ (2012) 66 IBA Global Insight  
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=e1bec75a-275e-45a5-9217-e37643513079. 
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Leading to the incident was the march on 11 August by striking workers against the 
dominant trade union called National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), accused of 
selling out its constituency. NUM was losing members to a new trade union called 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). The tension in the area 
mounted as security guards and police were killed apparently by striking Marikana 
mineworkers and this tension has been blamed for leading to the massacre.12 
McGregor argues that the Marikana incident should be seen in the broader context 
of labour and other problems within the mining sector; problems such as rising costs 
and fluctuating metal prices. It should also be viewed in the context of social 
discontent over lack of basic service delivery, inequality and poverty. According to 
her, miners are poorly paid and their work is dangerous.13 
South Africa‟s Labour Relations Act (LRA) 14  was formed to give effect to and 
regulate the rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution.15 The LRA is the 
principal labour legislation which regulates collective rights such as the right to strike, 
                                                          
12
Bond P & Mottiar S „Movements, protests in South Africa‟ (2013) 31 Journal of Contemporary Africa 
Studies 292. 
13
Mcgregor K „Comment and analysis: Africa massacre at Marikana‟ (2012). 
14
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
15
Section 1 LRA.  Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides:  
(1)  Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.  
(2)  Every worker has the right-  
(a) to form and join a trade union;  
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and  
(c) to strike.  
(3) Every employer has the right-  
(a) to form and join an employers‟ organisation; and  
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers‟ organisation.  
(4) Every trade union and every employers‟ organisation has the right-  
(a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities;  
(b) to organise; and  
(c) to form and join a federation.  
(5)  Every trade union, employers‟ organisation and employer has the right to engage in  
collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective 
bargaining. To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the 
limitation must comply with section 36 (1).  
(6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements contained in 
collective agreements. To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this 
Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36 (1).‟  
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to organise and the right to engage in collective bargaining.  Chapter 8 of the LRA 
also gives protection to employees against unfair labour practices and unfair 
dismissals. Chapter 3 of LRA regulates employers‟ organisations and trade unions, 
and chapter 5 provides for the establishment of participative structures in the form of 
workplace forums. 
The LRA does not say that much about the nature of collective bargaining and on 
how it should take place. It also does not compel collective bargaining and as the 
result of this the courts have no role in determining whether an employer should 
bargain collectively with a trade union, what to bargain about or at which level they 
should bargain.16 
With the objective of promoting orderly collective bargaining the LRA prioritises 
bargaining at sectoral level. This is done through the establishment of bargaining 
councils and statutory councils. Bargaining councils have powers to extend their 
agreements to all employers in their sector and level the competitive playing fields on 
their own terms.17  
There are two levels of collective bargaining, namely centralised collective 
bargaining, and decentralised collective bargaining. Centralised collective bargaining 
is about concluding agreements at the bargaining and statutory councils (thus, 
national level) whereas decentralised collective bargaining agreements are not only 
concluded at bargaining and statutory councils but may be concluded at plant level 
as well.18 
                                                          
16
Venter R, Levy A, Conradie M et al Labour Relations in South Africa (2012) 370; SANDU v Minister 
of Defence and Others 2007(4) BCLR 398 (SCA). 
17
Du Toit D „What is the future of collective bargaining?‟(2007) 28 ILJ 1420. 
18
Steenkamp A, Stelzner S & Badenhorst N „Right to bargain collectively‟ (2004) 25 ILJ 957-958. 
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Some parts of the South African mining industry uses the centralised bargaining 
system, which Bhorat and Oosthuizen argue is a poor bargaining system inherited in 
the 1980s and continued after 1994. They argue that it is ineffectual in dealing with 
plant specific issues, in other words the demands which are specific to particular 
mines that cannot be dealt with through national bargaining.19 
Chapter 5 of the LRA deals with workplace forums which are created to provide 
opportunity to all employees including non-union members to use statutory rights of 
participating in managerial decisions that may affect them. 
1.2 Research question 
Are the channels (collective bargaining and workplace forums) provided by labour 
law for employee participation in the mining sector effective? How they can be 
improved? 
1.3 Objectives of the research 
The main objective of this research is to asses the effectiveness of the channels  
(collective bargaining and workplace forums) created by the LRA for employee‟s 
participation in decision making in the mining sector. Problems related to employee 
participation will be examined to determine whether they are structural or due to 
shortcomings in the LRA.  If it is found that there are shortcomings of the labour 
legislation in this regard, recommendations on how the shortcoming can be 
addressed will be made. 
1.4 Significance of the research 
                                                          
19
Bhorat H & Oosthuizen M „Is Marikana a forerunner of national labour market instability and 
disruption?‟(2012) 3 http://www.polity.org.za/article/is-marikana-a-forerunner-of-national-labour-
market-instability-and-disruption-december-2012-2012-12-05. 
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The significance of this research paper is that it attempts to determine the efficacy of 
the current statutorily protected channels for employee participation in the mining 
sector against the backdrop of prevalent theories on employee participation. 
Although many labour law authors have commented on the role of workplace forums 
in South Africa, the relative advantages of workplace forums have not been analysed 
through the lens of the theories on employee participation. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
According to Christensen the various approaches to collecting data have been 
categorised as either descriptive or experimental, depending on the goals of the 
research. Descriptive research focuses on describing an event, situation or some 
phenomenon, while experimental research attempts to identify a cause-and-effect 
relationship.20 This research project adopts the descriptive research approach. 
Another approach distinguishes between qualitative and quantitative research. 
Quantitative research study focuses on numerical data that have been collected to 
answer a research question; whereas qualitative research study collects non-
numerical data for example written records to answer the research question.21 
This research is qualitative and is based on primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources are labour legislation and case law.22 The secondary sources are 
academic papers, journal articles and books. In addition, media reports and internet 
resources are used to provide a contextual background for the issues raised in the 
research paper. Where necessary, reference to models adopted in other jurisdictions 
is made on a case study basis. 
                                                          
20
Christensen BL et al Research Methods Design and Analysis 11 ed (2011) 29. 
21
Christensen BL et al (2011) 29. 
22
 Although there is not much case law on the topic of workplace forums, for reasons that will become 
apparent in chapters 2 and 3. 
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1.6 Structure of the research project 
Chapter 1 provides background information to this research project. It states the 
research question, the objectives and the methodology of the research paper. 
Chapter 2 consists of a literature review, setting out the current legal position and 
academic commentary on employee participation in decision making. It will provide 
an overview of the platforms that are created by labour legislation for employee 
participation in decision making, with specific reference to collective bargaining and 
workplace forums. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the mining sector and identifies the challenges that mine 
workers are facing, such as, injuries, levels of wages, working conditions and their 
respective trade unions. It also provides an overview of the means that are at their 
disposal to overcome these challenges. The suitability of the worker participation 
measures discussed in chapter 2 for the mining industry will be determined. 
Chapter 4 provides conclusions and recommendations with regards to employee 
participation in the mining sector. 
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Chapter 2 
The theories of employee participation in decision making 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the literature and theories written on employee participation 
in decision making within the workplace. It seeks to provide a clear understanding on 
the topic by looking at the challenges and advantages of employee participation in 
decision making within the workplace. This chapter will also visit theories written 
about collective bargaining and workplace forums as the two most effective forms of 
employee participation in South Africa. These two forms have been designed to 
perform at different levels of participation: collective bargaining at sectoral level as 
well as plant level and workplace forums at plant level. They are meant to support 
each other.  According to Grogan23 the Labour Relations Act (LRA) aims to move 
collective bargaining from plant level to sectoral level, and create new plant level 
institutions, namely workplace forums. Rather than having adversarial bargaining 
within a particular enterprise, workplace forums are created to promote participative 
management. 
2.2 Common Law of Employment 
The common law of employment precedes the LRA.  The South African common law 
contract of employment originated from contract of locatio conductio (letting and 
hiring) of Roman law. There were three types of locatio conductio namely; (a) locatio  
conductio rei (the letting and hiring of a specific thing for a money payment) (b) 
locatio conductio operis (the forerunner of the independent contractor); and (c) 
locatio conductio operarum (the letting and hiring of personal services in return for 
                                                          
23
Grogan J Workplace Law 10 ed (2011) 329. 
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remuneration).24  The common law of employment had its shortcomings; it created 
circumstances for employers to exploit employees, as it gave employers the balance 
of power and employees had limited rights.25 
The common law of employment has been criticised for lagging behind conditions in 
modern industry, commerce and for failing to recognise fundamental human rights. It 
was ill-suited to the collective relationship between employers and unionised 
workforces that spread throughout the industrialised world during the 19th century. 
The common law ignored the nature of the employment relationship, and deprived 
employees of the legal right to demand better conditions of employment. 26  In 
countries with vast numbers of unskilled and unemployed people who are desperate 
for jobs, the imbalance of bargaining powers favours the side of employer.27 It also 
did not cater for the inequality in bargaining power between employer and employee. 
The common law did not discourage exploitation of labour nor did it give employees 
a say in management decisions which affect their working conditions, and, lastly, it 
did not provide protection for job security.28 
2.3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
The South African Constitution29 with an entrenched Bill of Rights has an impact on 
all branches of the law, as it provides a platform for citizens to challenge legislation 
and actions taken by the state which infringe on their rights. Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, is the important and relevant chapter of the 
                                                          
24
Locatio conductio operarum applied only menial workers e.g. painters and sculptures. Locacio 
conductio  rei applied to slaves  Grogan J (2011) 2. 
25
For example, an employee would let her or his labour potential to the employer and the employer 
would decide its value. Swanepoel B South African human resource management: Theory & Practice 
4ed (2008) 89.   
26
Swanepoel B (2008) 90. 
27
Wallis M „The LRA and the common law‟ (2005) 9 Law Democracy & Development 181.  
28
Grogan J (2009) 3. 
29
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Constitution for the purpose of this research with specific reference to section 23 on 
labour relations rights. 
Section 27 of the interim Constitution30 precedes section 23 of the 1996 Constitution. 
The core content of section 27 is carried over into section 23 of the 1996 Constitution 
and the major changes are contained in the formulation of the right to bargain 
collectively, the right to strike and the exclusion of the right to lock-out.31 
Section 23 provides the foundation to the LRA as section 23 is mainly about 
facilitating the relationship between employers and employees and provides rights for 
both these parties. It is therefore essential that the provisions in the LRA on collective 
bargaining and workplace forums as channels for employee participation be 
evaluated in terms of the provisions of section 23. 
As was stated in chapter 1, the significance of this research paper is that it attempts 
to determine the efficacy of the statutorily protected channels for employee 
participation in the mining sector against the backdrop of prevalent theories on 
employee participation.   
Therefore, the following sections of the research paper introduce the more prevalent 
theories on labour relations and employee participation in decision making in the 
workplace.  
 
                                                          
30
 Interim Constitution, 1993. 
31
Interim Constitution, Section 27 (1): „Every person shall have the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions, and employers shall have the right to 
form and join employers' organizations. 
(3) Workers and employers shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
(4) Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
(5) Employers' recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not be impaired, 
subject to Section 33 (1).‟ 
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2.4 Labour Relations 
Venter et al describe labour relations as „a multifaceted, intricate and complex 
discipline that is characterised by a number of salient features.‟ 32   It is about 
interactions between three core players namely, employers, employees and the 
state.33 These interactions occur within a particular political, social and economic 
framework.34 
There are many theories with regards to labour relations. However, Venter et al point 
out that there are three major theories on labour relations namely, the unitarist 
approach, the pluralist approach and the Marxist approach.35 The unitarist approach 
believes in working together for the common goal as it views the organisation as a 
cohesive whole. As a result, there should be no serious conflict of interest between 
the employer and employees and there should be no power struggles between the 
parties.36 This approach views trade unions as problematic and unnecessary.37 
The pluralist approach is almost the opposite of the unitarist approach as it 
recognises that organisations have many aspects with different views. Therefore it 
accepts that it is impossible to prevent conflict, but that conflict can be managed 
through various institutional arrangements. 38  Unlike the unitarist approach, trade 
unions are accepted as an appropriate forum for co-ordinating these different 
interests.39 
                                                          
32
Venter R, Levy A, Conradie M et al Labour Relations in South Africa  4 ed (2011) 5.  
33
Hyman J & Mason B Managing employee involvement and participation (1995) 7. 
34
Venter R et al (2012) 5. 
35
Venter R et al (2012) 9. 
36
Bendix S The basics of labour (2006) 20. 
37
Bendix S (2006) 20. 
38
Singh PN & Kumar N  Employee Relations Management (2011) 15. 
39
Singh PN & Kumar N (2011) 15. 
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The Marxist approach is based on class conflict, and believes the conflict in the 
employee and employer relationship is the reflection of societal structures whereby 
the rich exploit the poor, and that because of this conflict is inevitable.40  Trade 
unions are viewed as a natural response of workers to their exploitation. In general, 
the Marxist approach advocates for the ownership of production to be shared 
amongst the people equally.41 
It is submitted that the pluralist approach is prevalent in South Africa, due to the 
inevitable conflict as a result of the history of inequality during the Apartheid era. 
Trade unions‟ contribution to the emancipation of black employees is undeniable.  
South African labour legislation recognises the important role that unions play in 
today‟s employees‟ struggles.  It also recognises the diversity within the country and 
workplaces. The following section looks at theories on participation and employee 
participation as they are central to this research. 
2.5 Participation and employee participation 
Different theorists, writers and academics have provided interesting and different 
analyses of the terms „participation‟ and „employee participation‟   
Saxena defines „participation‟ as „a voluntary process by which people, including the 
disadvantaged (in income, gender caste or education), influence or control the 
decisions that affect them.‟42 Anstey defines „employee participation‟ as  
„a process recognizing the needs and rights of employees individually and collectively to 
participate with management in organizational decision making areas beyond those 
usually associated with collective bargaining.‟
43
 
 
                                                          
40
Sivarethinamohan R Industrial relations and labour welfare: Text and Cases (2010) 17. 
41
Sivarethinamohan R (2010) 17. 
42
Saxena P „What is meant by people‟s participation‟ in Cornwall A The participation reader (2011) 31. 
43
Anstey M Employee Participation & Workplace Forums (1997) 1. 
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Strauss‟s definition of participation is „a process which allows employees to exert 
some influence over their work and the conditions under which they work‟.44 
What is evident from the above definitions is the fact that participation involves 
participants (people), it is a voluntary process and it is about influencing workplace 
decisions.  
There are three broad arguments that support participation namely, humanistic, 
power-sharing and organisational efficiency.45  In terms of the humanistic argument, 
it is argued that participation assists to satisfy employees‟ non-pecuniary needs and 
contributes to a sense of competence, self-actualisation and self-worth.46 The power-
sharing argument advocates participation for ideological and moral reasons. It further 
argues that „the traditional autocratic relationships are inherently unjust and 
inconsistent with the values of a democratic society.‟ 47  Regarding organisational 
efficiency, Strauss states that participation may change how employees do their 
jobs, how they and their unions relate to their employer, and how they perceive their 
jobs.48 
Hyman and Mason distinguish between two processes, which are, employee 
participation and employee involvement. They refer to employee participation as 
state initiatives to promote the collective rights of employees to be represented in 
organisational decision making, or the result of the efforts of employees to establish 
collective representation in corporate decisions.  Employee involvement is referred to 
as practices and policies which come from management and sympathisers of free 
market commercial activity and which purport to provide employees with the 
                                                          
44
Strauss G „An overview‟ in Heller F et al Organisational participation: Myth and reality (1998) 15. 
45
Strauss G (1998) 8. 
46
Strauss G (1998) 8. 
47
Strauss G (1998) 8. 
48
Strauss G (1998) 9.  
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opportunity to influence and where appropriate take part in the decision making on 
matters which affect them.49 With these different theories come different forms of 
participation. 
2.5.1  Forms of participation 
There are many different forms of participation which are used worldwide, but differ 
by countries, such as: 
(a) participation in development which is regarded as a way of mobilising people of a 
country to be associated in a development effort.50  
(b) Suggestion schemes are popular with both management and employees 
because they cover a wide range of issues, such as, use of materials, safety at work, 
administrative procedures, efficiency and cost saving, organisation of product, and 
the invention of new equipment and techniques.51 
(c) Indirect participation through collective bargaining is regarded by Anstey as the 
form of employee participation which is most evident worldwide.52  Anstey states that 
employers participate in collective bargaining for two reasons, which are „market 
control through which they seek to remove wages from competition and managerial 
control through which behaviour in the workplace is regulated by procedural 
arrangement‟.53  Collective bargaining is the means to „more predictable workplace 
behaviour and therefore production, legitimizing rules and substantive conditions of 
employment through the negotiation process‟.54  
                                                          
49
Hyman J & Mason B Managing employee envolement and participation (1995) 20. 
50
International Labour Office Workers’ participation in decisions within undertakings (1981) 9. 
51
Bennett R Employee Relations (1997) 84. 
52
Anstey M Employee Participation & Workplace Forums (1997) 4. 
53
Anstey M (1997) 4. 
54
Anstey M (1997) 4. 
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(d) Profit sharing is considered to be some kind of bonus payment and in practice it 
is seldom combined with greater participation decisions.55 
(e) With joint consultation, management retains control over the decision making 
process, but involves the workforce in decision making as it seeks to utilise the 
energy initiative of the workforce.56  
(f) Indirect participation, in the form of worker directors and works councils, is a form 
of participation that occurs through representation, usually at higher levels in the 
organisation and which tends to be power centred. 57   Trade unions have been 
doubtful about the efficacy of worker directors. They argue that worker directors do 
not offer new levels of influence over decisions affecting employees‟ lives; instead, 
they foresee them diluting the challenge of trade unions.58  Anstey also states that a 
management board deals with operational issues while worker directors‟ involvement 
is only at a supervisory board level on matters of policy and long-term strategic 
planning and that, as a result, they have little meaningful power.59  When it comes to 
works councils, they consist of elected employee representatives who are 
empowered to engage management on matters important to employees.60 
(g) Financial participation allows employees to become part-owners of companies 
through being allocated shares in their firms as supplements to wages. This 
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motivates employees to greater efforts because they have a direct interest in their 
employer‟s profitability.61  
(h) Direct participation has been described as task rather than power oriented 
because of the involvement of employees and their supervisors directly at points of 
service delivery or production.62 Quality circles are the most common form of direct 
participation. They are small group meetings that are created voluntarily to perform 
quality control functions in the workplace. A quality circle works under the leadership 
of its supervisor and it meets to solve work related problems and its meetings are 
held on company time.63 According to Anstey a quality circle operates alongside 
formal structures in the enterprise and does not demand major shifts in power 
relations in traditional hierarchically structured organisations.64 
(i) Workplace forums generally focus on non-wage matters, such as, work methods, 
restructuring, changes in the organisation of work, introduction of new technologies 
and work methods, physical conditions of work, and health and safety.65 
The above discussed forms of participation are from the global perspective, not all of 
them feature in the South African context of participation. Only two of the above 
mentioned forms feature in South Africa namely: collective bargaining and work 
place forums.  They are all important as they serve a specific purpose depending on 
the approach that the country adopts whether it is pluralist, Marxist or unitarist. The 
following section will look at the objective of employee participation. 
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2.5.2  Objectives of participation 
There are three main groups of objectives of participation: ethical or moral 
objectives, socio-political objectives, and economic objectives.66  In the ethical or 
moral context, participation is designed to promote individual fulfilment or 
development in line with a conception of human rights and dignity.67  Socio-political 
objectives vary widely and are mostly presented under the label of industrial 
democracy, which is motivated by the democratic system which encourages 
participation, not only to vote for the conduct of public affairs, but also at the place of 
employment. 68  Economic objectives relate directly or indirectly to increasing the 
efficiency of business by allowing the interaction between labour and management.  
They also aim to improve the quality and quantity of production and the utilisation of 
labour, equipment and raw material as well as introduction of new techniques.69 
Participation is seen as a mechanism to reduce areas of conflict between labour and 
management to improve labour relations.70 
The purposes of participation include the improvement of the quality of working life 
and to increase business efficiency. Bennett argues that participation should 
enhance motivation of employee regarding their employers‟ activities.71 
2.5.3 Advantages and disadvantages of participation 
Bennett states that the principal argument in favour of participation points to its 
mobilisation of talents, expertise, resources and the experiences of employees who 
are encouraged to develop their decision making capacities and are also 
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encouraged to become more involved with the efficient management of the 
company.72 
Other advantages include that it: 
 „Encourages responsible and flexible attitudes among employees and positive 
responses to change. 
 Assists staff development. 
 Enables management to receive valuable feedback from employees about day-to-day 
operations. 
 Involves a greater number of people in taking decisions and hence a lower risk of 
important factors being overlooked.‟
73
 
 
Bennett further argues that participation can be motivated for on the grounds of 
promotion of the democratic ideal and social justice within a nation.74  It is also 
beneficial to management in that: 
 „Its efficiency should increase as employees become involved in decision making. 
 Loyalty and commitment to trade unions may be replaced by greater employee loyalty 
to the firm. 
 The management of change is facilitated, since employees are made aware of the 
environmental circumstances that create the need for change. 
 The machinery of participation (committees, works councils, quality circles, etc.) 
provides a means for channelling conflict into peaceful institutional procedures.‟
75 
 
Not only can participation be beneficial to management, but to employees as well. It 
provides employees with power, information, knowledge and rewards.76 In terms of 
power, this means that employees are given power to make decisions that would 
add quality to their working lives, and this power also makes them influential as it 
allows them to have an input in decisions made by management.77 
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With regards to information, participation provides them with substantial information 
on both the quantity and quality of the employer‟s business.78 When it comes to 
knowledge, employees can acquire new skills and abilities from the training and 
development that would be provided by the company. It is the company‟s 
responsibility to ensure that they provide such training, as they would assist in 
ensuring that employees take right decisions when faced with situations of making 
important decisions.79   
With regards to rewards, this is about the employer rewarding employees for using 
the information, power and knowledge gained through participation for the good of 
the employer.80  There are also criticisms of employee participation. Levine shares 
the following possible disadvantage of employee participation:  
 „Workers may be less informed than managers, and the premises upon which they make 
their decisions may be different. The rewards motivating workers to share their ideas may 
be larger than the value of the ideas themselves.  
 Once becoming committed to a decision, employees may be reluctant to change it.  
 Participation is time consuming, and if decisions are made by groups, reaction to changing 
environments may be particularly slow.  
 Once a precedent of participation is established, withdrawal of the right to participate 
becomes difficult.  
 Cohesive, participative groups may unite against management to restrict production and 
prevent change.‟
81
  
  
It is submitted that the advantages of employee participation outweigh the 
disadvantages, especially as participation takes both parties to the employment 
relationship into consideration, where previously employees were not heard and 
participation seeks to fill that gap.   
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Whereas the focus in this section has mainly been on employee participation from a 
global perspective, the next section will focus on employee participation in South 
Africa. 
2.6 Employee participation in South Africa 
2.6.1 South African labour relations 
In the South African context there is a tripartite relationship in labour relations which 
comprises of employees, employers and the state. The role of employers is to 
purchase labour and provide work. The employees‟ role is to provide their labour to 
employers in exchange for a wage. The state‟s role is to enforce, monitor and 
regulate the statutory frameworks that guide the interaction between employees and 
employers. 82  In South Africa, the main legislation used to monitor and regulate 
labour relations is the LRA. 
South Africa is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The 
principal purpose of the ILO is to provide for the international regulation of labour 
standards with the aim of promoting social justice and peace and to end unfair 
competition based on exploitative and inhumane conditions of labour.83 As a member 
of the ILO, South Africa is obligated to abide by the objectives of the ILO.84 Those 
obligations are evident in section 1(b) of the LRA and section 2 (b) of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA). 
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2.6.2 The Labour Relations Act 
The purpose of the LRA is to advance social justice, economic development and the 
democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling its primary objects which are: 
(a) „to give effect to and regulate fundamental rights   conferred by section27 of the 
Constitution; 
(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the 
International labour Organisation; 
(c) to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers 
and employers‟ organisations can, 
(i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of 
employment and other matters of mutual interest; and  
(ii) formulate industrial policy and  
(d) to promote  
(i) orderly collective bargaining; 
(ii) collective bargaining at sectoral level; 
(iii) employee participation in decision, making in the workplace; and  
(iv) the effective resolution of labour disputes.‟
85
  
 
The LRA aims to encourage collective bargaining and remove it from the plant to the 
sectoral level. Workplace forums are created as the institutions at plant level.86  The 
next section will focus on these two forms of participation, collective bargaining and 
workplace forums, with their intended levels of participation.  
2.6.3  Collective Bargaining  
Labour law can be divided into individual labour law and collective labour law. 
Individual labour law is the law that governs the relationship between individual 
employees and their employers.87 It is concerned with the rights and duties of the 
individual parties to the employment relationship and the rules are aimed at ensuring 
individual justice in the workplace. Collective labour law governs the relationship 
between employers and organised labour. It provides a framework for collective 
bargaining between the bargaining parties in this case which are trade unions and 
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employers or employers‟ organisations, to formulate industrial policy, to determine 
mutual agreements in relation to conditions of employment, wages and other matters 
of mutual interest.88    Collective labour law rules recognise the modern industrial 
society, and that both employers and employees have different and opposing 
interests, and tend to protect and promote their particular interests.89 
There are defining features of collective bargaining. The first one is its concern with 
power imbalance between the employees and the employers; it does not function if 
there is imbalance between bargaining parties.90 Secondly, if parties do not come to 
terms, the use of power is used as the last resort; collective bargaining encourages 
conciliation.91  Finally, it becomes a requirement in situations whereby an action 
considered inappropriate is taken by one party without the party seeking consensus 
from the other.92    
Chapter 3 of the LRA concerns the promotion of collective bargaining.  Venter 
defines collective bargaining as a „mechanism for organised groups of workers and 
their employers to resolve conflicting interests and pursue agreement over common 
interests‟.93 For Grogan, collective bargaining is „the process by which employers 
and organised groups of employees seek to reconcile their conflicting goals through 
mutual accommodation.‟94  The inclusion of the right to collective bargaining signifies 
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the recognition that collective bargaining should have the status of a fundamental 
right and no longer be a mere social objective.95 
The main purpose of collective bargaining is the regulation of the terms and 
conditions of employment between the employer and the employee (trade unions), 
and the primary objective of trade unions in engaging in collective bargaining 
„seeks to give effect to its legitimate expectations that wages and other conditions of work 
should be such as to guarantee a stable and adequate form of existence and as to be 
compatible with the physical integrity and moral dignity of the individual, and also that jobs 
should be reasonable secure.‟
96
 
 
Another purpose of collective bargaining is to serve as a method of dispute 
resolution.97 
For the purpose of collective bargaining there are two agents, namely, trade unions 
and employers‟ organisations. A trade union is described as 
„any organisation whose membership consist of employees, which seeks to organise and 
represent their interests both in the workplace and society, and in particular, seeks to 
regulate their employment relationship through the direct process of collective bargaining 
with management.‟
98
 
 
The function of trade unions is to represent their members in collective bargaining 
with their members‟ employers and to represent their members in their grievances 
and disciplinary matters. Trade unions also appoint officials to bodies which ensure 
employers‟ compliance with their statutory obligations.99 
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Du Toit places an emphasis on the important role that trade unions play in collective 
bargaining. He states that „if the law plays a permissive role in collective bargaining, 
then it will be up to the interaction of the two involved parties to determine its effect 
and content, and this makes effective trade unionisation crucial”.100 What makes 
trade unionisation crucial is the fact that employers in general are bearers of power 
and can do without collective bargaining while the other party, the employees, 
cannot, and it is therefore essential for them.101 
Trade unions‟ counterparts are employers or employers‟ organisations. The LRA 
states that an employers‟ organisation is an association of employers for the purpose 
of regulating relations between employers and employees or trade unions.102  Du 
Toit highlights three important aspects of collective bargaining. First, it has value for 
participants (employees and employers): for employees, it is the means of 
maintaining certain standards of distribution of work, of stability of employment and 
of rewards; for employers, it is a means of maintaining industrial peace. Secondly, 
the bargaining arena allows trade unions to engage with broader issues and exert 
political pressure. Finally, it has an instrumental role in labour market regulation.103 
The LRA fails to expressly provide for a duty to bargain just like its predecessor the 
1956 LRA. Current labour legislation does not give courts powers of compelling 
employers to bargain collectively. 104  Trade unions are granted a fixed list of 
organisational rights, such as, access to an employer‟s premises, stop-order 
                                                          
100
Du Toit D „What is the future of collective bargaining?‟ (2007) 28 ILJ 1411. 
101
Du Toit D (2007) 1411. 
102
LRA, section 213. 
103
Du Toit D (2007) 1405. 
104
Grogan J (2011) 310. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
 
facilities, and to information.105 Apart from that, the rest is left to the parties to decide 
how their bargaining relationships are to be structured.106 
Collective bargaining is voluntarily and parties cannot be compelled to bargain, 
because the current LRA imposes no general duty on employers to bargain 
collectively.107  The LRA does not compel bargaining nor does it require the state to 
bargain with public sector trade unions. Steenkamp et al argue that „the 
constitutional drafter envisaged the freedom to engage in collective bargaining, 
rather than the right and reciprocal duty to do so.‟108 The LRA recognises union led 
strikes as a way of exercising economic power as a response to an employer who 
refuses to bargain.109   
The LRA aims to encourage collective bargaining and remove it from the plant to 
sectoral level.110 It envisages workplace forums to fill the participation gap at plant 
level. The next section focuses on workplace forums which are about employee 
participation at plant level. 
 
2.6.4 Workplace forums 
Workplace forums are created as the institutions of employee participation in 
decision making at the plant level.111  Whereas collective bargaining is intended to 
                                                          
105
LRA, section 12. 
106
Grogan J (2011) 310. 
107
Steenkamp A et al (2004) 954. However this does not apply in the military sector. In SANDU v 
Minister of Defence and Others; Minister of Defence and Others v SANDU 2007 (4) BCLR 404 (SCA), 
the Supreme Court of Appeal declared that the Minister of Deference is obligated to negotiate with 
SANDU within the military bargaining council on all matters of mutual interest. The court‟s decision 
was based on the fact that the LRA does not apply to the National Defence Force or to personnel 
employed in the intelligence community.  
108
Steenkamp A et al (2004) 955. 
109
Steenkamp A et al (2004) 955. 
110
Grogan J (2011) 329. 
111
Venter R et al (2012) 484. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
 
be reserved for trade unions and employers‟ representatives for matters of mutual 
interest, issues relating to the distribution of the profits of the enterprise and to 
changes in general conditions of service of employees, workplace forums are 
designed to encourage workers participation and at plant level.112 
Section 79 of the LRA provides that a workplace forum - 
(a) „must seek to promote the interests of all employees in the workplace, whether or not they 
are trade union members; 
(b) must seek to enhance efficiency in the workplace; 
(c)  is entitled to be consulted by the employer, with a view to reaching consensus, about the 
matters referred to in section 84; and 
(d)  is entitled to participate in joint decision-making about the matters referred to in 
section86.‟ 
 
The main goal of workplace forums is to provide employees with a voice in certain 
aspects of decision making outside of the collective bargaining process. What 
motivates this goal is the idea that the workplace forums will increase profitability and 
production which will result in increased job satisfaction and a reduction of workplace 
disputes.113 
Before the LRA, workplace forums did not exist in South Africa. They were created in 
terms of the LRA to supplement collective bargaining. With regard to the 
establishment of workplace forums, section 80(1) of the LRA states that they can be 
established in any workplace provided that the employer has more than 100 
employees. The applicant must be a registered trade union or trade unions acting 
together which represent a majority of the employees within the workplace with more 
than one hundred employees. 114  As was stated above, they serve four main 
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functions: promotion of interest of all employees, enhancing efficiency at the 
workplace, consultation and participation in joint decision making.115 
Workplace forums are designed to supplement collective bargaining rather than 
undermine it. They provide an opportunity, not only for union members, but for all 
employees in a workplace to exercise for their statutory rights of participation in 
decision making that may affect them.116 
Even though workplace forums seem to be a good idea in terms of involving every 
employee in an organisation, South Africa has experienced a slow rate of 
establishment of workplace forums since their introduction by the LRA. 117 
Steenkamp et al state that there appears to be a general sense that even though 
plant level participation is a commendable proposition, trade unions are less 
interested in committing themselves to this form of participation, fearing that bodies 
like workplace forums will undermine their independence and their role in collective 
bargaining.118 
Workplace forums have the benefit of allowing trade unions to interact with 
managerial decision making at an early stage, rather than being confronted with a 
final decision that the management has taken without a trade unions‟ presence.119 
Furthermore it gives trade union access at an early stage to all kinds of information 
that concerns their members.120  Lastly, trade unions do not have to waste time 
fighting to establish and defend the rights to participate as these rights are 
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institutionalised; instead they can focus their energies on strategies for making their 
participation effective.121 
Workplace forums enjoy certain rights, such as, that in respect of certain issues they 
have the right to consultation;122 employers cannot just ask for the forums‟ opinion on 
a proposed decision, the employer needs to consult with the aim of reaching 
consensus.123  Workplace forums may suggest alternatives to work related matters 
and if the employer rejects them, reasons have to be provided.124  Section 86 of the 
LRA compels the employer to engage in joint decision making with the forum on 
certain issues.125 
Smith argues that these forums appear to give employees a stronger and freer voice 
in the workplace. On the surface, the LRA appears like it is meaning to facilitate the 
beginning of a co-operative labour relationship between the employer and 
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employees; however, these provisions might not be the vehicle for true democracy in 
the workplace. Participation in decision making cannot be seen as industrial 
democracy in the sense that the collective voice of the employees will determine 
business decisions to be implemented, but rather as something that reflects 
possibilities of influencing management‟s decisions.126 
The perceived weaknesses of workplace forums fall into a number of categories, the 
most prominent of which may be classified as structural and theoretical. 127  The 
structural problem starts with section 80 (1) of the LRA which requires that workplace 
forums can be established in workplaces comprised of at least 100 workers. This 
high threshold has been criticised as it is estimated that about 74 per cent of 
employees in the formal sector are excluded. This further gives powers to majority 
unions operating in large companies to initiate the establishment of workplace 
forums.128 Minority unions and non-union employees are expected to go along, and 
lastly this section excludes medium sized and small companies.129   
The second structural weakness is found in section 81 of the LRA, which is the 
prominent role (to negotiate on behalf of the rest of employees irrespective of their 
union affiliations) given to a union that has the majority of the workers at a plant. This 
provision seems to be an attempt to secure the status of majority unions in power 
and this could have the effect of weighting the forum‟s composition with union 
officers.130 
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The third structural weakness is regarding joint decision making.  The LRA does not 
give workplace forums rights to initiate joint decision making or consultation, it can 
only respond to the move made by the employer.131 The forum only holds the right to 
be consulted on changes that management has announced a desire to implement; 
they lack powers to demand that an employer should engage in joint decision 
making with it on issues that the forum wishes to raise on its own. The forums‟ 
activities are largely reactive not proactive. 132  Manamela further states that „[a] 
representative trade union and employer may conclude a collective agreement that 
confers on the workplace forum the right to joint decision making in respect of 
additional matters and / or remove any matter from the list of matters requiring joint 
decision making.‟133 
The last structural weakness has to do with the LRA‟s separation between 
productive and distributive issues; it is unclear whether the forum or union should 
step in as the employee‟s representative with regards to disputes.134  Section 84 of 
the LRA may be interpreted to require that any issue not explicitly with in the forum‟s 
jurisdiction falls within the collective bargaining process.  Smith argues that this could 
have an impact on co-operative solutions to issues and it could also give unions 
power to bargain collectively over topics that might be characterised as issues that 
should be discussed by the forum.135 
Historically in South Africa unions have operated mainly local, but recently statutory 
provisions have developed centralised bargaining councils. However, at plant level 
supplementary bargaining by unions has continued. Currently, therefore, workers 
                                                          
131
 Manamela ME (2002) 731 
132
Smith CM (2000) 615. 
133
Manamela ME (2002) 731. 
134
Smith CM (2000) 615. 
135
Smith CM (2000) 616. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
 
potentially have two different representatives operating on the shop floor, and 
confusion may arise as to whom the employees should turn to when a given dispute 
arises.136 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the theories regarding participation and employee 
participation, as well as two channels of participation, namely; workplace forums and 
collective bargaining. The theories examined encourage participation between 
employers and employees as they align participation with democracy. The channels 
(collective bargaining and workplace forums) are not complementing each other as 
they are intended to.  Trade unions prefer collective bargaining, as they fear that 
workplace forums may undermine them. The following chapter will explore further 
the employee participation platforms created by the LRA to see whether they are 
effective with regards to balancing the interests of the employee and employers in 
the South African mining sector.  
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Chapter 3 
MINE WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING 
3.1 Introduction 
Mine workers are faced with different challenges ranging from poor working 
conditions to socio-economic conditions. This chapter focuses on the major 
challenges which have been linked to recent unrest in the mining sector, such as 
poor and dangerous working conditions and low income levels. In addition the 
chapter examines whether the platforms created by the LRA, particularly workplace 
forums are appropriate to address these challenges. 
3.2 Challenges faced by mine workers 
3.2.1 Health and safety in the mines 
The mining sector has a history of fatalities. However, statistics show a decline in the 
number of occupational fatalities in the mining sector in South Africa from 94 
fatalities for 100,000 workers in 1992 to 35 fatalities for 100,000 workers in 2008.137 
The number of fatalities continued to decline, as in 2011 there were 116 reported 
deaths for the year, compared to 128 in 2010 and 168 in 2009.138  An overall decline 
of 31% in the fatality rate from 2012 to 2013 has also been recorded.139 Despite the 
decline in the number of occupational fatalities, the fatality risk is still high. 
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The Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 (MHSA) was enacted by the legislature 
to address work related fatalities and health related issues in the mining sector.  
Section 1 of the MHSA states the objects of the act as follows: 
a) to protect the health and safety of persons at mines; 
b) to require employers and employees to identify hazards and eliminate, control and minimise 
the risks relating to health and safety at mines; 
c) to give effect to the public international law obligations of the Republic that concern health 
and safety at mines; 
d) to provide for employee participation in matters of health and safety through health and safety 
representatives and the health and safety committees at mines; 
e) to provide for effective monitoring of health and safety conditions at mines; 
f) to provide for enforcement of health and safety measures at mines; 
g) to provide for investigations and inquiries to improve health and safety at mines; and 
h) to promote-- 
i) a culture of health and safety in the mining industry; 
ii) training in health and safety in the mining industry; and 
iii) co-operation and consultation on health and safety between the State, employers, 
employees and their representatives.
140
 
The following sections examine the challenges mentioned earlier faced by mine 
workers that have been linked to recent instances of labour unrest in the mining 
sector. 
3.2.2 Safety in mines 
Safety in mines is a major concern and both the state and employers have attempted 
to reduce the dangers of working in the mines. The MHSA requires employers to 
report incidents and dangerous occurrences that take place at the mines.141 This 
information is then captured into the South African Mines Reportable Accident 
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Statistical System (SAMRASS) and analysed in order to improve the working 
conditions in South African mines.142  
A recent publication by the Department of Mineral Resources shows a decrease in 
fatalities by 31% from 2012 to 2013.143 The publication further reported on fatalities 
by commodity between 2012 and 2013. The commodities were grouped into gold, 
platinum, coal and other mines. Gold mines‟ fatality rates improved by 33%, platinum 
by 30%, other mines by 40%, while coal remained the same as the previous year.144 
Safety in the mines remains a concern still. In a recent incident which took place at a 
Harmony Gold mine, 17 miners were trapped 1.7 kilometres below ground. Eight 
workers were found dead inside the mine and one miner has not been accounted for. 
This incident has been regarded as one of the most devastating since that of 2009, 
where nine employees were killed in a rock fall in a platinum mine.145 This recent 
accident is an indication that mines still have a lot to do in order to improve safety of 
the employees. 
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3.2.3 Health and illnesses on mines  
South African mines are faced with epidemics of tuberculosis (TB), silicosis and 
noise exposure. 146  Based on the report published by National Institution for 
Occupational Health, the average rate of pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) in 2012 was 
192/1000.  Black male miners‟ PTB rates increased from the early 1990s to 
368/1000 in 2007. However, there has been low annual decrease to 289/1000.  The 
rate of white male miners contracting PTB remained lower than of the black man 
miners at 43/1000 in 2012.147 Silicosis rate in gold miners has also increased from 
320/1000 in 2009 to 368/1000 in 2012.148 
With regards to noise exposure, the recent data indicates no improvement as the 
industry noise levels range from 63.9 to 113dba and approximately 73.2% of mine 
employees are exposed to noise levels.149 
To combat these challenges the South African Chamber of Mines has implemented 
a programme called Mining Industry Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH), the 
aim of the programme is to reduce the increasing epidemic of noise exposure, dust 
exposure, fall of ground and dangerous transport machinery.150  
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3.2.4  Income levels 
Mineworkers income levels are another area of concern and that has been evident 
during the recent labour unrest in the mining sector. With reference to the Marikana 
massacre, Brand argues that the alleged cause of the conflict was poverty combined 
with low incomes.151 He argues that rock-drill operators are regarded as unskilled 
employees and are underpaid. They suffer from abuse not only from the mine 
owners but labour brokers who can take up to R5 000 from their wages.152 
 
 A finding of research conducted by the Labour Research Service reveals that the 
monthly minimum wage in the mining sector by commodity group in 2012, was 
R4 222 for gold mines, R4 852 for coal mines, R6 540 for diamond mines and 
R5 396 for platinum mines. The research also reveals that the mining sector has the 
highest median minimum wages in comparison with the other sectors.153  
 
Dissatisfaction over wages has been the biggest contributor to the labour unrests in 
the mines. In 2012 the coal mining industry was hit by a strike, where about 100, 000 
employees downed their tools for better pay.154 The gold industry also experienced  
strikes as its employees downed their tools in 2012 for better pay.155 Both the coal 
and gold industries have resolved the payment grievances. The platinum sector‟s 
grievances remained unresolved;  specific reference can be made to the strike at 
Lonmin platinum mines, where rock drill operators who were members of NUM were 
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dissatisfied with their union‟s preferred across the board increase of 10% over the 
proposal that would see the workers getting higher increases. Rock drillers 
demanded a massive increase, they refused to work.156   
 
The strike still continues, as the bargaining parties have not reached an agreement. 
This strike has had a negative impact on the mining companies, as well as their 
clients. It was reported that if this protracted strike continues, Impala Platinum as the 
world‟s second largest platinum producer would have to cut its supply to its 
customers to 40% of demand in the coming months, with similar consequences for 
Anglo American Platinum and Lonmin.157  
 
3.2.5 Living Conditions 
Mine workers‟ living conditions are a matter for concern. There is a deterioration of 
formal structures and, as a result, many mine workers live in shacks and informal 
settlements.158  
 
Many mine workers are still living in congested mine hostels, where mine workers 
share rooms. However there is a commitment shown by mining companies to 
improve these living conditions. For example, Lonmin Plc are planning to convert 
and upgrade hostels into single room as well as family units. 26 hostel blocks have 
                                                          
156
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already been converted into 542 bachelor units. They have also completed 1728 
units of affordable employee houses.159     
 
3.2.6 Legislation addressing challenges of mine workers 
In chapter 2, the statutory employee participation channels found in the LRA, 
collective bargaining and workplace forums, were outlined.  Many of the challenges 
of mine workers outlined above are issues that are considered to be suitable for 
employee participation.  
 
As was stated above, section 1(d) of the MHSA states that one of the main 
objectives of the MHSA is „to provide for employee participation in matters of health 
and safety through health and safety representatives and the health and safety 
committees at mines‟.  Section 25 requires that health and safety representatives be 
elected and appointed in all mines with 20 or more employees,160 and health and 
safety committees created in all mines with 100 or more employees.161 
 
A link between the employee participation through health and safety representatives 
and committees appointed and established in terms of the MHSA, and workplace 
forums established in terms of the LRA, is created by section 84(5) of the LRA, 
which states: 
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Subject to any applicable occupational health and safety legislation, a 
representative trade union and an employer may agree, 
(a) that the employer must consult with the workplace forum with a view to 
initiating, developing, promoting, monitoring and reviewing measures to 
ensure health and safety at work;  
(b) that a meeting between the workplace forum and the employer 
constitutes a meeting of a health  and safety committee required to be 
established in the workplace by that legislation; and  
(c) that one or more members of the workplace forum are health and safety 
representatives for the purposes of that legislation.  
 
For issues relating to relating income or salary, although minimum wages are 
determined in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA),  
employee participation by way of collective bargaining on wage increases occurs in 
terms of the LRA.162 
 
It can therefore be said that, although other legislation regulates aspects of the 
challenges faced by mine workers, the LRA remains the main legislation making 
provision for and regulating employee participation in decision making on mines.  
The following section scrutinises the effectiveness of the channels created by the 
LRA in the mining sector in addressing the employee challenges. 
 
3.3 Employee participation 
 
3.3.1 Statutory requirement for collective bargaining 
One of the key institutions of employee participation is collective bargaining; its 
primary role is to provide a platform where remuneration and working conditions of 
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employees can be negotiated by trade unions and employers.163 Power relations 
between the parties would then determine the outcome of the negotiations.164 
 
The LRA promotes voluntary self-governance through collective bargaining. There is 
a legal and institutional process in place for intervention when the collective 
bargaining process fails; bodies, such as the CCMA (Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration), are there to intervene in such instances.165 Bargaining 
councils have the responsibility to monitor the enforcement of their agreements and 
are also involved in resolving disputes.166  In sectors where collective bargaining 
does not exist or is weak, the state intervenes, and in those cases conditions of 
employment are set through ministerial determinations.167  In other words, the LRA 
does not really state the rules of engagement, such as at what level the bargaining 
should take place, and what issues it should cover. A discretion to determine these 
issues is given to the parties that are involved in a bargaining council, that is, 
registered employer organisations and trade unions. These registered employer 
organisations and trade unions are the ones that can establish bargaining councils. 
 
There are two levels of collective bargaining, namely, centralised collective 
bargaining, and decentralised collective bargaining. Centralised collective bargaining 
is about concluding agreements at the bargaining and statutory councils, whereas 
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decentralised collective bargaining agreements can not only be concluded both at 
statutory councils and at plant levels as well.168 
 
3.3.2 Collective bargaining in the mining sector 
In the South African mining industry centralised bargaining is used, although there 
are some exceptions. Bhorat and Oosthuizen argue that it is a poor bargaining 
system, inherited in the 1980s and continued after 1994. They argue that it is 
ineffectual in dealing with plant specific issues; in other words, there are demands 
which are specific to the plants or mines and which cannot be dealt with through 
national bargaining.169 
Bargaining councils in the private sector cover employees who are classified as 
unskilled or semi-skilled while managers, technicians and associate professionals 
are excluded. 170  Chapter 8 of the BCEA allows the establishment of sectoral 
determinations.  In instances whereby employees and employers of a specific sector 
are already covered by collective agreement concluded at a bargaining council, the 
Minister of Labour does not establish sectoral determinations;171 as the result of this, 
the mining sector does not have a sectoral determination.   
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3.3.2.1 Centralised collective bargaining 
Centralised collective bargaining happens at the sectoral level. 172  In the mining 
sector this form of bargaining is dated back to 1915.173 It has always remained 
informal, and operates on agreements between the participating parties (Chamber of 
Mines South Africa and trade unions). The centralised collective bargaining system 
has been used in gold mining and coal mining;  the coal mining forum covers 60 to 
65 per cent of employees, and the collective bargaining forum for gold mines covers 
about 90 per cent of the work force.174   
A centralised bargaining system is used by the Chamber of Mines South Africa 
(CMSA), which is the employers‟ organisation that seeks to represent the employers‟ 
interests. Every two years centralised negotiations on conditions of employment and 
wages are held between the Chamber of Mines, which represent the majority of gold 
and coal mine employers, and the recognised trade unions. 175  However, the 
diamond, platinum and base metal mines, as well as some of the smaller gold and 
coal mines, negotiate on decentralised bases.176 
Based on the report from CMSA, there are three recognised unions in the gold 
mining industry, namely, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Solidarity and 
UASA. These three unions are part of prior agreements, and the Association of 
Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) has also been invited to join the 
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bargaining process.  Before 2005 CMSA used to have separate negotiations with 
each of the three unions.177  
Negotiations for different categories of employees take place in one forum. The 
negotiations usually standardise conditions of employment and wages. However, in 
instances where some mines face financial constraints then flexibility may occur, by 
providing variable rates.178   
Section 23(1)(d) of the LRA provides for the extension of collective agreements to 
non-union members has always been applied.179 The thinking behind the extension 
of collective agreements is to avoid unfair competition in a industry.180 The extension 
of collective agreements has been challenged by AMCU. In Chamber of Mines South 
Africa v AMCU & Others181, the application was on the basis that AMCU members 
were bound by a collective agreement which was entered between the applicant and 
the other unions. AMCU contested that they were bound by the agreement.182 AMCU 
argued on the basis of majoritarian rule as it claimed to be a majority union on some 
of the mines.183 However, it was proven that NUM had more members.184  The court 
ruled in favour of the applicant and the majoritarian rule was upheld.   
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The coal industry also recognises three unions, namely, NUM, Solidarity and UASA. 
Their bargaining agreement shows that its bargaining council covers more than 
wage issues and conditions of employment.185  
The LRA does not enforce bargaining topics between the bargaining parties; this 
depends on them considering the matter as one of mutual interest. Du Toit et al state 
that:  
“A matter of „mutual‟ interest is one in which the trade union and employer parties have a 
material and simultaneous interest. In addition it must be related to the employment 
relationship and an issue that can be reduced to, or regulated by, a collective 
agreement.”
186
  
 
As much as this form of collective bargaining has not experienced the same level of 
problems relative to decentralised collective bargaining,187 It does not cover plant 
level issues, as stated earlier.  This form of collective bargaining, just like any other 
form, experiences challenges during the negotiation phase between the parties. In 
September 2013, the gold mining industry was hampered by strikes as wage 
negotiations broke down. Mine workers were demanding a wage increase of 
between 60 and 100 percent.188 
 
3.3.2.2 Decentralised collective bargaining  
Decentralised collective bargaining takes place at the plant level.189 This form of 
bargaining has a negative impact on collective bargaining coverage, where there is 
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no provision for the extension of collective agreements. The collective agreement 
would only cover and benefit the majority union and its members.190   
 
3.3.2.3 Decentralised collective bargaining in the mining sector 
The platinum mining industry makes use of company based bargaining. The principle 
of majoritarianism applies, whereby unions with 50 + 1 per cent or more of the 
workers within the category sign a recognition agreement which will allow that union 
to do the bargaining on behalf of every member and non-member.191 This system 
was intended to limit union rivalry in the sector.192  
 
Section 18 of the LRA empowers majority unions, as it allows them to acquire 
organisational rights, and also gives employers and majority unions the right to 
decide on representativeness thresholds. Section 18 of LRA reads as follows: 
 
(1) An employer and a registered trade union whose members are a majority of the 
employees employed by that employer in a workplace, or the parties to a bargaining 
council, may conclude a collective agreement establishing a threshold of 
representativeness required in respect of one or more of the organisational rights 
referred to in sections 12, 13 and 15. 
(2) A collective agreement concluded in terms of subsection (1) is not binding unless the 
thresholds of representativeness in the collective agreement are applied equally to 
any registered trade union seeking any of the organisational rights referred to in that 
subsection. 
 
As a result of this, smaller unions may not be recognised and they are excluded from 
bargaining and deprived of potential benefits. Kruger and Tshoose argue that 
because of this section of the LRA minority unions are marginalised, and diversity 
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and pluralism are not as respected as they should be according to democratic 
principles.193 
 
Adding to the exclusion of minority unions is section 25 which makes provision for 
agency shop agreements. In terms of this section members of minority unions might 
find themselves in a position where they are forced to pay required monthly agency 
fee to the majority union, if they enjoy the benefits negotiated for by the majority 
union. Section 26 of the LRA also contributes to the marginalisation of smaller 
unions. This section concerns closed shop agreements, that require all employees 
covered by the collective agreement creating the closed shop to be or become 
members of the majority trade union.. 
 
3.3.2.4 The effect of majoritarianism in the mining industry  
Hartford has commented on the failures of decentralised collective bargaining in the 
mining industry. His first argument is that of the heavy reliance on the practice of 
union majoritarianism, whereby the union with the majority membership in the plant 
gets to bargain on behalf of all employees, and is regarded as the sole 
representative of all employees‟ views. This practice has the following 
characteristics:   
„[A] high degree of centralisation of bargaining at commodity sector or company level; 
a heavy unspoken reliance by companies on the majority union to manage employee 
expectations; a merging of bargaining units in some instances to support the 
majoritarian practice and create a semi-closed shop environment for the majority 
union; a raising of thresholds for entry of minority unions to gain recognition making 
the majority union stable and secure as the sole bargaining partner; and finally an 
agency fee to be paid by nonunionised employees to the coffers of the majority unions 
pro rata on their membership representativity.‟
194
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Majoritarian rule always gives the union that has a majority of employees an upper 
hand when it comes to negotiations. As a result a union is able to manipulate the 
negotiations to benefit its members.   
 
According to Hartford, these trends have evolved over the last three decades and 
the LRA gave statutory legitimacy to them.195 As a result negotiating parties find 
themselves in a co-dependent comfort zone, and this comfort zone had the following 
features at both the company and sectoral levels: 
„[S]ignificant material benefits to labour union representatives; heavy management 
reliance on union driven collective processes which trumped any real and sustained 
direct employee engagement; little actual verification of union constituency based 
accountability on the ground to its membership; growing production line management 
disownership of employee communications in favour of reliance on HR and majority 
union to drive communication to employees; almost a complete absence of 
independent verification of employee sentiment and views; and a system of 
stakeholder engagement forums at sector, company, mine and shaft level – all of 
whom were so comfortable in their routinised, co-dependent relationship that they 
dismally failed to probe and hear the signals of arising discontent amongst 
employees.‟
196
 
 
This practice has made the union leadership powerful and alienated groups of 
workers, such as migrant workers. These workers have been victims of a wage 
bargaining practice that came from a reliance on percentage based wage 
adjustments whereby senior employees in the bargaining unit received a lesser 
percentages wage adjustment than junior entry level employees. This made sense 
but the actual rand and cents outcome is the opposite because the cash reward from 
wage bargaining for those at the bottom is less than that for those at the upper levels 
of the bargaining unit and the wage layers between the bottom and top has grown.197 
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3.3.2.5 Representation of constituency by shop stewards 
Another problem that is created by this system is the gap between shop stewards 
and their constituency. Since the democratic transition of 1994, the mining sector 
has lost the principle of “democratic worker control‟ and there is no constituency 
based representation of members by shop stewards.198  
 
NUM has two types of arrangement for shaft stewards. The first is for part-time shaft 
stewards, who perform their union duties while they remain in their regular jobs.  
 
The other arrangement is for full-time shaft stewards, who are full-time in their union 
positions. 199  They do not stay in their mine jobs, but become full-time union 
operatives who work from an office on the premises or in the union of the mine‟s 
regional offices. They receive higher remuneration and benefits, and often do not 
ever return to their shop floor positions. Their salaries can be triple their usual 
monthly salary and this type of position has become a ticket to advancement.200 
 
Shop stewards are elected at shaft level, but the practice is that they do not account 
directly to the constituency. Instead, the pressure to account to leaders higher up the 
ranks has intensified. Shop stewards lose touch with underground workers, they 
prefer to move across mines, shafts and occupy offices which are situated above 
ground. This shows that the unions may promote the interests of their leadership 
rather than those of their constituencies.201 
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There have been allegations of corruption and selling of jobs by shaft stewards. At 
one of the mines, the Karee mine, members of the NUM alleged that promotions 
were controlled by shaft stewards, that they demand a bribe in order to facilitate the 
appointment of a new employee, and that this bribe is then split between the shaft 
stewards and human resources personnel of the company. Bribes are also used in 
respect of promotions: union members pay money in order to be promoted.202 
 
When it comes to representation in the decision making structures with 
management, all key decision making structures are dominated by senior employees 
who are in the bargaining unit, while those who are directly affected - the „rank and 
file‟ - are not present, or at best a tiny minority is present. There are no checks and 
balances to ensure that the shop stewards cover all employees, and that they uphold 
the constituency based representation throughout their terms of office.  As a result, 
shop stewards fail to account to their constituency.203 
 
With special reference to the Marikana massacre, Alexander states that the upward 
mobility of members of NUM has brought serious tensions and new dynamics in the 
union. In particular, the shaft steward position is under the spotlight as it is a popular 
recruiting ground for management in the mining industry. Occupational mobility of 
leading activists and shaft stewards has the potential of negative impact on the 
servicing of the needs of union members, because it removes skilled shop floor 
leaders from the union and leaves leadership positions unoccupied.204 
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A survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)205 shows 
that the trust in trade unions has declined. During the illegal strikes in the mining 
sector, many mine workers voiced dissatisfaction with their trade union leaders, 
accusing their unions of being too close to management and too willing to 
compromise on workers‟ demands. Trade unions showed a far more significant fall in 
confidence in 2012 than 2011. In 2011 43% of South Africans indicated that they 
trusted trade unions, falling to 29% in 2012, with 40% reporting that they distrusted 
trade unions and 31% remaining neutral.206 
 
As the result of this distrust, members of trade unions may be inclined to join other 
unions.  In the case of platinum mines, NUM which has been the dominant union, 
has lost its position to AMCU. This has resulted to inter-union rivalry.  
 
3.3.2.6 Trade union rivalry  
In the platinum industry the rivalry between NUM and AMCU has been intense, and 
escalated to deaths and sparked unlawful strikes.  Rock drill operators, who were 
members of NUM, were dissatisfied with their union‟s preference for across the 
board increase of 10% over the proposal that would see the workers getting higher 
increases.  Rock drill operators demanded a massive increase, and subsequently 
refused to work through NUM as the official union. To back their demands they 
downed their tools. Thousands of them left NUM to join AMCU.207  
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As the result of this move of members to AMCU, NUM lost its recognition rights at 
platinum mines. At Lonmin, the employer expressed a preference for an agreement 
that will include all the unions as they wanted to move away from the „winner takes it 
all‟ model which was used when NUM was in control. However, AMCU opposed the 
proposal arguing that it should be entitled to majority status, as was previously 
enjoyed by NUM.208 
 
3.3.2.7 Economic implications 
Prolonged strikes in the mining sector have a negative impact on the mining 
companies as well as on their clients. It has been reported that if the (at the time of 
writing) 15-week strike by platinum mine workers continues, Impala Platinum as the 
world‟s second largest platinum producer would have to cut its supply to its 
customers to 40% of demand in the next three months. This wage strike has also hit 
Anglo American platinum and Lonmin.209 Currently the strike has cost the platinum 
mine companies about R 15.5 billion in lost revenue.  Striking employees have also 
been affected financially as they lost R 6.9 billion in income.  
 
Looking at the two forums for collective bargaining, it can be concluded that there 
are valid concerns regarding the representation of ordinary mine workers, whether 
through centralised collective bargaining or decentralised collective bargaining. The 
next section examines whether workplace forums as provided for in the LRA provide 
a viable alternative to collective bargaining as a platform for workers participation in 
the mining sector. It highlights some obstacles in the creating and use of workplace 
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forums, such as, how the infiltration of trade unions has affected the establishment 
and the functioning of the workplace forums.    
 
3.3.3 Workplace forums 
3.3.3.1 Statutory requirements for workplace forums 
The aims of South African workplace forums are to encourage power sharing, 
enhance productivity and to promote shop floor democracy in the workplace. They 
institutionalise a consultative role.210 They provide a platform for employees and 
employers to discuss non-distributive issues. 
Workplace forums‟ focus is qualitative, which means that they focus on non-wage 
matters, such as, work methods, restructuring, changes in the organisation of work, 
introduction to new technologies and work methods, physical conditions of work, and 
health and safety.211 
Workplace forums have statutory recognition to go beyond the limits of collective 
bargaining whereby the employees have an institutional voice in managerial decision 
making.212 
The statutory functions of workplace forums are threefold: to enhance efficiency in 
the workplace, promote the interests of all employees (union members as well as 
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non-union members), and for consultation and participation in joint decision making 
with the employer.213 
Members of workplace forums are elected by employees, with places being allocated 
on the basis of the occupational structure of the workforce.214 The aim is to ensure 
that employees who are not members of the union in the absence of a closed shop 
agreement are also represented in the forum.215 
After a workplace forum has been established the employer is obligated to share 
information concerning the company‟s performance generally and its future 
prospects, both employment and financial. Section 89(1) obligates an employer to 
disclose relevant information that would allow the forum to engage effectively in joint 
decision making. However, section 89(2) prevents the employer to disclose 
information which is legally privileged.  It is then required of an employer to consult 
with the forum before implementing any proposal concerning the issues relating to 
the forum.216 
 
3.3.3.2 Workplace forums in the mining sector 
There are no workplace forums in the mining sector; however, there are committees 
and forums which are enforced by MHSA. Their focus is mainly on the health of 
employees and their safety.217 A report from the Harmony Gold Mines shows that a 
measure of engagement between the mine and its employees and trade unions 
                                                          
213
LRA section 79; Klerk G „Adversial „participation and antagonistic cooperation?: workplace forum, 
employee participation and lean production‟ transformation‟ (1999) 9 available at 
http://history.ukzn.ac.za/ojs/index.php/transformation/article/viewFile/775/591.  
214
LRA section 82(1)(b). 
215
Wood G & Mahabir P „South Africa‟s workplace forum system: A stillborn experiment in the 
democratisation of work?‟ (2001) 32 Industrial Relations Journal 234. 
216
Steadman F „Workplace forums in South Africa: Critical analysis‟ (2004) 25 ILJ 1171. 
217
See section 3.2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 54 - 
 
exists. However, it is notable that there is no mention of workplace forums but rather 
of what is referred to as „future forums‟218 whose nature and function are unclear. 
According to the report, there are annual employee engagement surveys, regular 
meetings with organised labour as required by the employer, quarterly conferences 
and newsletters, and ongoing „future forums‟ and use of social media. With regards 
to engagements with unions, there are annual negotiations, quarterly presentations 
and ongoing meetings.219 
Therefore, there is no evidence of workplace forums existing in the mining sector. 
However, a similar situation seems to occur in all other sectors in South Africa.220 
At mines, shaft level union stakeholder engagement forums are established across 
the mining industry. They are largely operational forums to deal with work 
scheduling, safety and production, but have low capacity in people problem solving 
and low stakeholder management skills, as is reflected in a low people problem 
resolution rate. There is limited face to face engagement by management with 
employees outside of the meetings.221 
 
3.3.3.3 Problems with the establishment of workplace forums 
Very few workplace forums have been established in South Africa.222 Trade 
unions disapprove of them as they feel that they would marginalise their 
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influence both over their members and in the workplace.223 They also fear that 
they could serve to co-opt employees and reduce their willingness to oppose 
employers‟ proposals. As a result South Africa has witnessed very few 
workplace forums being established.224  
Trade unions fear that workplace forums will undermine their independence and 
their traditional role in collective bargaining. Not only that, it is also doubtful that 
they will agree that conditions of employment be subjected to joint decision 
making as this will exclude terms and conditions from the right to strike. Trade 
unions further argue that in many South African companies the level of conflict 
is so high to an extent that institutionalised participation cannot resolve them.225 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest South 
African trade union federation rejects the idea of workplace forums, and 
supports the idea of union based engagement rather than independently 
elected workplace forums It argues that they pose a danger for unions:  
„We strongly support the argument that workplace forums should be union-based 
rather than independently elected. In other words, the powers of information, 
consultation and joint decision-making should be conferred directly on the shop 
stewards committee; alternatively, the shop steward committee should nominate 
members to the workplace forum. Otherwise there is a danger that the workplace 
forum will either become a substitute for the shop steward committee, or will be a very 
weak consultative forum. A workplace forum independent from union structures will be 
a recipe for division.‟
226
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The LRA provides a link between voluntarism and flexibility which are both 
advocated by union views of employment relations and job creation.227 
In the research conducted at Felixton Sugar Mill on employees‟ perceptions about 
workplace forums, it was found that the majority of employees responded positively 
to the idea of workplace forums. However, it was shown that respondents who were 
not well trained or educated for their jobs saw no benefits in workplace forums and 
ones who were suitably qualified understood the benefits.228 It can be concluded 
from these findings that education is a considerable distinguishing factor between 
the views of these two different groups of respondents with regards to the usefulness 
of workplace forums. Based on this, it leaves one with a conclusion that the better 
employees are trained or educated for their jobs the more the need for workplace 
forums will be apparent.   
 
In South Africa the dominant role given to trade unions threatens the objectives and 
the position of workplace forums. First, in order for workplace forums to be 
established a collective agreement needs to be concluded, which involves collective 
bargaining of which trade unions are part. 229  Secondly, the LRA allows shop 
stewards, who may have a mindset of adversarial bargaining which opposes the co-
operative approach, to be elected onto workplace forums. Members of trade unions 
may feel threatened by the principle of workplace forums to serve the needs of all 
employees regardless of the trade union affiliations.230 In South Africa majority trade 
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unions have the power to decide whether or not to establish workplace forums,231 
and as has been established above, they seem to have opted not to. 
Workplace forums are also rejected by the management representatives, who are 
concerned about the method of enforcement being adopted and the principles of 
voluntarism being ignored. 232  Steadman lists the following concerns raised by 
management representatives about the provisions of the LRA regarding workplace 
forums: 
„They raised questions about balancing rights and responsibilities, that chapter V 
proposed far-reaching new rights for employees going to the heart of business 
effectiveness and efficiency while there was no corresponding protection for 
employers against the abuse and misuse of these rights by employees. They argued 
that the confidentiality provisions provided some, but inadequate, protection against 
the disclosure of confidential information, but no recourse was provided in the case of 
'other abuses'. They were also concerned about the extent to which employees would 
be capable of understanding the issues raised in workplace forums, and the ability and 
readiness of the unions themselves to participate effectively, through shop steward 
representatives, in workplace forums. Employers were also concerned about disputes 
automatically becoming disputes of right.‟
233
 
 
The LRA has not been able to reconcile the tension between workplace unionism or 
collective bargaining and workplace forum activity, nor has it been able to reconcile 
the tension between the need to democratise the workplace and the need to 
increase productivity and efficiency.234 
 
With these above mentioned obstacles in the creation and use of workplace forums, 
it is important to examine whether they are able provide a complementary 
participation channel to collective bargaining in the mining sector. 
 
3.3.3.4 A greater role for workplace forums in the mining sector?  
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The absence of workplace forums in this sector is a problem. It is submitted that if 
workplace forums were functioning in the mining sector, the recent problems that 
have been experience by this sector would have been minimised. Workplace forums 
can be a viable alternative in addressing the shortcomings of decentralised collective 
bargaining and particularly the issues caused by majoritarianism. Section 82 of the 
LRA provides the requirements for constitutions of workplace forums. According to 
this section, anyone can be part of the workplace forum, irrespective of their union 
affiliations. Section 82 (1)(b) requires that the distribution of seats in the workplace 
forum be the reflection of the occupational structure of the workplace, meaning that 
workplace forums are open to every employee irrespective of their union affiliation.   
 
Another important fact is that the LRA requires regular meetings between the 
employer and the workplace forum.  Section 83 states the following:    
                
 „(1) There must be regular meetings of the workplace forum.  
 (2) There must be regular meetings between the workplace forum and the        
employer, at which the employer must,  
(a) present a report on its financial and employment situation, its performance 
since the last report and its anticipated performance in the short term and in the 
long term; and  
(b) consult the workplace forum on any matter arising from the report that may 
affect employees in the workplace.‟ 
 
 
These meetings would provide an opportunity to resolve daily plant level issues 
before they escalate to bigger problems. 
 
When it comes to the issue of accountability to the constituency, section 83(3) 
provides a platform for consultation between the workplace forum and the employees 
of the company. The section states that:  
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„(a) There must be meetings between members of the workplace forum and the 
employees employed in the workplace at regular and appropriate intervals. 
At the meetings with employees, the workplace forum must report on,  
(i) its activities generally;  
(ii) matters in respect of which it has been consulted by the employer; 
and  
(iii) matters in respect of which it has participated in joint decision, 
making with the employer.  
(b) Each calendar year, at one of the meetings with the employees, the 
employer must present an annual report of its financial and employment 
situation, its performance generally and its future prospects and plans.  
(c) The meetings of employees must be held during working hours at a time and place 
agreed upon by the workplace forum and the employer without loss of pay on the 
part of the employees.’  
 
These meetings make the workplace forum account to its constituency, as they give 
employees an opportunity to be up to date with developments of the company.  This 
would further allow the employees to voice their concerns on any work related 
matters that may rise. It also allows employers to be up to date with employees 
concerns.   
 
With regards to intra-union rivalry, workplace forums provide less space for union 
rivalry which is caused by the movement of union members from one union to 
another. There is diversity in workplace forums as they consist of employees from 
different unions and ones who do not belong to any union.  
 
With this viable alternative being provided for in the LRA, this paper is in support of 
the establishment of functioning workplace forums in the mining sector to reduce 
future dissatisfaction and unrest . 
 
3.4 Chapter conclusion 
In the mining sector three employee participation platforms have been evaluated: 
centralised collective bargaining, decentralised collective bargaining and workplace 
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forums. Centralised collective bargaining appears to be more effective than 
decentralised collective bargaining in terms of employee participation in decision 
making. Decentralised collective bargaining is failing as it has been found that trade 
unions are failing to represent their constituency. This type of collective bargaining 
benefits the majority union and its leadership and representatives, such as, shop 
stewards and their respective unions leaders.  Workplace forums do not function at 
all in the mining sector. There is a need for the establishment of functioning of 
workplace forums, in order to reduce mining challenges and to close the gap 
between the employees and employers. It is therefore submitted that before calls 
that the LRA be amended to address the problems related to collective bargaining in 
the mining sector highlighted above are considered, consideration should be given to 
the implementation of the until now neglected provisions of the LRA dealing with 
workplace forums.  The concluding chapter makes some recommendations 
regarding the establishment of workplace forums. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 Conclusions 
The stated aim of this research paper is to assess the effectiveness of the channels 
(collective bargaining and workplace forums) created by labour law for employees‟ 
participation in decision making in the mining sector. As shown above, although 
provision is made for these channels for employee participation, they are in practice 
not effective with regard to ensuring employee participation in decision making in the 
mining sector. From the previous chapter it is clear that one channel (collective 
bargaining) does exist and function, albeit with significant problems, whereas the 
other (workplace forums) has not been utilised.  These two platforms are supposed 
to support one another, but collective bargaining has suppressed workplace forums, 
because bargaining councils are platforms where employers‟ organisation and trade 
unions conduct their negotiations. Trade unions regard workplace forums as threats 
to their mandates and influence with employers.235 This has not only occurred in 
mining sector but throughout all employment sectors in South Africa.  
 
In the mining sector the dominant position of trade unions is inevitable judging by 
their powers and the tripartite relationship COSATU has with the ruling party, the 
ANC, and the SACP. Centralised collective bargaining appears to be functioning 
better than decentralised collective bargaining. Decentralised collective bargaining is 
centralised around the union in control and its shop stewards.236  Certain individuals 
(shop stewards) are looking after themselves and neglecting their constituency. As 
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the result the constituency has lost faith in its leadership.237 This is evident in the 
current inter-union conflict within the sector. 238  This inter-union conflict had a 
negative impact on South Africa‟s economy as production is on stand-still. The 
conflict has shifted from trade union versus employer to trade union versus trade 
union. 239  This conflict has not only negatively affected the employers but is 
paralysing South Africa‟s economy as well as the livelihood of mine employees.240 
 
4.2 Recommendations 
Workplace forums can play an equally important worker participation role than 
bargaining councils. Workplace forums play a very important role in the development 
of employees as they open new opportunities of participating in decision making. 
Workplace forums provide an exposure to issues that were previously the exclusive 
domain of management and they provide training to employees to help them deal 
with those complex issues. They empower previously disadvantaged employees.241  
 
However the concept seems to be neglected in South Africa by all the parties 
involved (trade unions, employers and the state).242  Steadman is of the view that 
Chapter V of the LRA should be amended to embrace the principles of voluntarism, 
self-regulation and joint problem solving. Making workplace forums mandatory would 
be rejected by both employers and unions considering their attitude towards them, 
and workplace forums should not be imposed as this defeats the spirit of co-
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operation.243  However, it can also be argued that the lack of workplace forums in 
South Africa is due to the LRA making the establishment of workplace forums 
voluntary.  
 
This paper supports Steadman‟s proposal of government created incentives to 
encourage parties to establish workplace forums; incentives, such as, training 
opportunities to acquire skills to equip employees and skills development levy 
rebates to employers. These incentives would ensure that the employees are well 
skilled when it comes to their jobs, better equipped to participate in workplace forums 
and in return this would improve and increase the productivity of the company. Both 
bargaining councils and the CCMA should have a responsibility for promoting the 
establishment of workplace forums.244 
 
Section 80(1) also needs to be amended. There should be no minimum limit on the 
number of employees who are employed in a plant or company before a workplace 
forum can be established. The LRA appears to promote workplace democracy in 
companies that employ more than 100 employees. It is submitted that the threshold 
is too high, and if that is the case then smaller companies are excluded from 
workplace democracy.245  
 
South Africa can use German works councils as an example. In Germany works 
councils can be established in any company that has five to more permanent 
employees with voting rights. This model of workplace democracy has been working 
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for Germany.246   Manamela further explains how this works in Germany: „Every 
establishment with more than five employees older than 18 years, three of whom 
have been employed for at least six months is required by law to establish a works 
council.‟ 247  In the absence of an explanation for the minimum threshold for 
establishing workplace forums in South Africa, consideration should be given to 
adopting the German model.   
 
The term „representative trade union‟ is problematic. It is defined in section 78(b) as 
„a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade unions acting jointly, that have 
as members the majority of the employees employed by an employer in a workplace.‟ 
 
This means that the majority union or two more registered unions acting jointly are 
given the opportunity to apply for the establishment of the workplace forum. Judging 
by the unions‟ attitude towards workplace forums, the possibility is great that there 
will not be any workplace forums as the powers are vested in unions to establish 
them.248 Thus, section 80 (2) needs to be amended so that „representative trade 
union‟ is replaced by „employee‟ including both unionised and non-unionised 
employees. 
 
As was stated above, South Africa can learn from the German experience. In 
Germany the mistrust between trade unions and work councils used to exist, but has 
since turned into a good relationship. As a result of their good relationship, both 
pillars of the employee representation system have been strengthened. Weiss 
explains how this was achieved: 
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„Trade unions in a pragmatic way learned how to cope with the challenge and thereby 
to optimise the functioning of the system of workers' representation as a whole. This, 
of course, was only made possible by the jointly accepted understanding that 
collective bargaining and workers participation fulfill different functions, that the one 
cannot simply be substituted for the other, and that each has merits of its own.‟
249
 
 
These are the features which characterise relationship between work councils and 
unions in Germany: First, there is a division of labour between the two parties, day to 
day challenges and arrangements in the company are left to work councils. Trade 
unions focus on sectoral collective bargaining.250 
 
Secondly, collective agreements provide a framework that needs to be followed by 
employers and works councils. In other words, in practice, discretion is given to both 
employers and work councils to regulate the implementation of collective 
agreements by way of works agreements. Thirdly, difficult restructuring processes 
can only be carried out successfully on the basis of co-operation between trade 
unions and works councils, as it seems to be the only way to get legitimacy from the 
workforce as a whole.   Fourthly, in companies where works councils exist, trade 
unions play a role of informal supporter; they offer employees information on the 
advantages of having works councils. Fifthly, works councils have turned out to be 
efficient in recruiting members for trade unions, and it can be argued that without 
works councils the dwindling union membership problem would have been a bigger 
concern.251 Lastly, works councils help to provide information to trade unions in day 
to day challenges and in return trade unions stay up to date with new developments 
and challenges.252 
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One of the weaknesses of collective bargaining is dealing with plant level issues in 
the mines.  The mining sector in South Africa can learn from the German experience 
on division of functions between unions at sectoral level and workplace forums at 
plant level. As in Germany, workplace forums could help to provide information to 
trade unions on daily challenges before they escalate into bigger problem. The co-
operation between the two channels of employee participation can create a 
relationship which ultimately may benefit unions, should workplace forums in South 
Africa turn out to be as efficient in recruiting members for unions as works councils 
have been in Germany. 
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